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location of the threshold improved both individual benefit and conserva-
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I. Introduction
Common-pool resources have been a focus of both economic research and governmen-
tal policy. The “Tragedy of the Commons” explains that common-pool resource suffer
from overuse and degradation (Hardin, 1968). Establishment of effective governmental
policies for conservation of common-pool resources are needed as without definitive in-
tervention this diminishment will continue, especially as demands for resources increase
with a growing population. The struggle for policy makers to resolve the conflict be-
tween resource conservation and growing current resource needs ultimately results in
ever-changing polices. This conflict can be observed in policies addressing a variety
of common-pool resource problems around the globe, including pollution and emission
regulations, fisheries management, and water resources management. Polices to limit re-
source use are created in order to prevent disastrous environmental impacts, especially in
instances where a resource may be degraded or destroyed if use passes a natural thresh-
old. However, when the time comes for the polices to go into effect, they are unenforced
due to current resource demands. This raises the question, “what are the impacts of a lack
of policy target enforcement and threshold uncertainty on the lifespan of common-pool
resources?”
This paper addresses common-pool resources in the context of lack of governmental
commitment and follow-through which creates policies and policy targets that are con-
stantly readjusted. In order to prevent crossing inherent natural resource and common-
pool thresholds which would cause deleterious environmental consequences, govern-
ments often create policies which set resource limits or targets. However, policy makers
biased by the present and struggling to commit to the current policy, readjust the tar-
gets and limits when they are passed. There has so far been no analysis of the impact
of changing policy targets and threshold uncertainty on group and individual resource
use behavior and the subsequent longevity of the common-pool resources. The data pre-
sented here based on a series of laboratory experiments show that when policy targets
go unenforced or are readjusted, shorter Common-Pool Resource lifespans result. The
findings of this research are critical to addressing environmental and resource manage-
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ment problems and the development of more effective long term policies.This paper also
has broader implications for other governmental policies and develops a case for policies
which promote widespread public access to reliable information on the current condi-
tion of a common-pool resource. This paper will demonstrate that the optimal way to
conserve a common-pool resource is to provide users of a resource access to reliable
information regarding the level and status of the common-pool.
The process of repetitive threshold readjustment affects many areas of government.
It is the norm for establishing the U.S governmental debt ceiling (Deb, 2011).1 It is
already happening with Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards and is likely to be
seen with the U.S. greenhouse gas emission regulations (Smith, 2011; Horowitz, 1996).2
The consequences of this repetitive threshold readjustment have not fully been studied.
Correˆa et al. (2014) examined unenforced fishing management policies and found that
fishing defesos were left completely unenforced in the Brazilian Amazon.3 The absence
of enforcement led to an increase in the number of fishers, leading in turn to a decline in
fish stocks. “In short, the current [unenforced] policy is worse than no policy,” (Correˆa
et al., 2014).
Correˆa et al. (2014) was one of the first to examine the impacts and consequences of
unenforced common-pool resource management policy. Since the findings and results
are from the Brazilian Amazon, it is important to combine their results with results from
studies that are more general, enabling a broader interpretation appropriate not only to
the fishing defesos of the Amazon but also to other common-pool resources. In other
examples, such as those mentioned above, a study with field data would not be possible
since the only observation is the given case; there is no counter-factual data available.
This can be solved with laboratory experiments, which offer the cleanest possible ap-
proach for identifying treatment effects. A laboratory study adding to the findings of
1Between 1995 and February 2011 the debt ceiling has been raised 12 times (Deb, 2011).
2“The Obama Administration will not meet its September deadline for releasing its 2025 Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards. The new deadline is mid-November of this year [2025]. CAFE is a national effort to
increase fleet-wide vehicle fuel-economy averages to 54.5 mpg by 2025.,” (Smith, 2011).
3A fishing defeso is a type of fishing regulation which utilizes a closed season and fishing permits that require fish-
ermen to stagger their entry, limiting the number of fishermen with access to the fishery at any one time. With defesos
fishermen are also compensated during times which they do not have access to the fishery.
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Correˆa et al. and other literature, to address moving policy targets in a general context,
would have applications for many areas of common-pool resource management. Addi-
tionally, a laboratory study can create controls and develop a greater understanding of
the driving factors behind common-pool resource depletion and user behavior.4
To understand the impacts of changing threshold policies and threshold uncertainty,
I conducted a Common-Pool Resource laboratory experiment in which groups of five
withdraw tokens from a shared pool with a threshold for punishment, similar to an in-
herent threshold for environmental consequences. There were three experimental treat-
ments, 1.) Complete Threshold Information, 2.) Incomplete Threshold Information and
3.) Sporadically Enforced Targets. In Complete Threshold Information, the punishment
threshold is revealed to all participants and is automatically enforced. In Incomplete
Threshold Information, the punishment threshold location is unknown to resource users.
Sporadically Enforced Targets represents the real-world case in which the conflict be-
tween current and future resource use results in changing policy targets. In Sporadically
Enforced Targets, guesses of the threshold location are made by a group policy maker
and could be enforced before a new policy maker is assigned. The basic game and exper-
iment will be explained in Section 2. Section 3 presents my hypotheses and theoretical
predictions. Results and a discussion of the experimental findings can be found in Sec-
tion 4. Conclusion and policy recommendations follow in Section 5.
A. Background
Water resources present a particularly relevant system for illustrating the interventions
of policymakers and the need for a greater understanding of their impacts. As an exam-
ple, Lake Kinneret provides two-thirds of Israel’s water and serves as a source of water
for neighboring countries in exchange for peace.5 In an already tense region, a shortage
4In Correˆa et al. (2014), through survey, they were able to determine that with unenforced fishing management
policies in the Amazon the Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) had decreased. Since the number of fishermen had increased
in addition to the decline in fish stock. Therefore, it was unclear if the decrease in CPUE is attributed to the open-access
externality or the decrease in the fish stock. In a laboratory study one is able to control for resource users and would be
able to effectively account for changes in effort or other user behavior attributed to changes in resource stock and changes
in the number of resource users.
5Lake Kinneret is also known as the Sea of Galilee or Lake Tiberias.
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of Israel’s water resources would not only strain diplomatic relationships across borders,
but would also place an undue burden on the economy and on human and environmental
health (Starr, 1991). Israel withdraws more water than the natural rate of replenishment,
creating an annual water deficit of approximately 4,200 million cubic meters (Kislev,
2001). Since water is a basic human right, the price of water is set to near zero. The
annual water deficit continues to increase as the demand for water grows and the price of
water remains low (Berman and Wihbey, 1999; Plaut, 2000).
Israel’s water issues can be thought of as a common-pool resource problem based
on three characteristics: (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Gardner et al., 1990; Sethi and So-
manathan, 1996; Hardin, 1968) First, water can be withdrawn over time and is rival in
consumption. The water that an individual demands and subsequently consumes cannot
be utilized by any other consumer. Many stakeholders demand water from the Kinneret
including but not limited to individuals, agriculture and industry across multiple coun-
tries. Second, the current amount of water which is withdrawn from the Kinneret is
suboptimal(Starr, 1991; Amir and Fisher, 2006). Third, there does exist a more efficient
level of water use. To combat the depletion of water, the Israeli government created an
invisible threshold, or “red line,” in the Kinneret to mark a danger level for the water
level.6 In theory, if the amount of water in the Kinneret drops below this threshold,
the government will take action and stop pumping water from the Kinneret to prevent
saltwater intrusion and complete depletion of the resource (Feitelson and Fischhendler,
2005).
However, as the water level approaches or drops below the “red line,” the govern-
ment shifts the threshold downward (Parparpov et al., 2013; Plaut, 2000; Feitelson and
Fischhendler, 2005). As a result, consumers were not faced with penalties from the gov-
ernment due to the decline of the water level below the threshold, such as changes in
the price of water or a decrease in water availability. The status of Kinneret and the red
line appear frequently in news headlines in Israel. “Kinneret ’Red Line’ to be Lowered
6The natural threshold is the water level below which the Kinneret would have damaging environmental conse-
quences, such as saltwater intrusion, and water depletion. The red line threshold was created as a warning for the natural
threshold. It should not to be mistaken for the natural threshold itself.
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More” from the Jerusalem Post is an example of one the frequent headlines. This illus-
trates the struggle faced by the policy makers as well as the fact the red line and water
level in the Kinneret are changing with no consequence from the government. There
are still societal consequences from the crossing the threshold, including changes to the
ecological system and environment, challenges in changing infrastructure to account for
the lower water level, and a non-optimal allocation of resources.
The original threshold was created so that future policymakers would be aware of the
water shortage and impending environmental consequences for over-extraction. It was
hoped that they would eventually devise a solution to the challenges of meeting the water
demands of Israel and its neighbors in a sustainable manner (Feitelson and Fischhendler,
2005). Unfortunately, since the threshold was not permanently and irrevocably estab-
lished, policymakers continue to repeatedly lower the threshold, deferring action on the
problem to future policymakers, each time neither willing to give up consumption to-
day nor to meaningfully address water conservation. The changing “red line” threshold
demonstrates the continual conflict that faces the Israeli government as the steward of this
water resource. While the government and current policymakers recognize that there is a
water problem, there is a trade-off between conserving the resource with the associated
costs of limiting consumption today versus the less immediate cost of depleting the re-
source and its value. This is the situation addressed by Horowitz (1996) with theoretical
literature on governmental present biased preferences.7 Consumers and policymakers
may not know the exact point at which the value of the resource drops to nearly zero.
They are tasked with balancing the conflict between consumption and conservation and
devising a solution before the resource becomes valueless.
While Correˆa, Kahn, and Freitas (2014) was one of the first studies to examine a spe-
cific unenforced common-pool resource management policy, examining a specific case
of unenforced fishing policy in the Brazilian Amazon, other literature has addressed the
impacts of not following through with rules and punishments in other settings (Aschuler,
7Horowitz (1996) examined pollution emission under both a market and non-market discount rate, finding that a non-
market discount rate results in governmental present preferences. This ultimately results in higher levels of pollution.
This was purely a theoretical work.
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2000; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2009; Bloch, 1998; Stormshak et al., 2000). Albert As-
chuler (2000) explains in his book that unenforced laws lead people to commit more
crimes. Investigators in the fields of behavioral psychology and education have studied
child performance and behavior with various parenting styles. They found that when
parents do not enforce rules and their associated punishments, children exhibit more ex-
treme and disruptive behaviors (Stormshak et al., 2000). For example, not enforcing the
rules, such as continually adding more numbers to count to after “10,” is worse than not
having rules. This is also supported in studies of crime and unenforced laws. Bloch
in his 1998 paper compares various methods of automobile speed-control and finds that
when the speed limit is unenforced, drivers exceed the speed limit more frequently and
to a greater extent than the when the speed limit is enforced. Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2009) show, both in a theoretical and empirical framework, that an unenforced law can
be worse than having no law at all. They found that this is the case when 1.) motivation
for the law is to solve a prisoner’s dilemma (if there was no law everyone would be stuck
in the bad equilibrium) and 2.) some people will follow the law regardless of it being
enforced.
Past common-pool resource experiments have not examined cases of individual or
group behavior when a threshold exists. Additionally, common-pool resource experi-
ments have not incorporated unenforced policy targets or threshold uncertainty. There
have been other experiments in which individuals evaluate depletion of a common-pool
resource when there is some externality associated with the depletion. In contrast to
common-pool games, many public goods games do have incorporated thresholds. Public
goods games have been shown to have similar results to common-pool resource games
(Dawes, 1980; Fleishman, 1988; Sell and Son, 1997). The objective payoff that individ-
uals receive for defecting by withdrawing from the common-pool resource or not con-
tributing to the public good is greater than the payoff for contributing. Additionally, if
cooperation falls below a certain rate, all individuals will receive a lower payoff. Thresh-
old public goods games have been studied, but only with a fixed threshold (Palfrey and
Rosenthal, 1984; Bagnoli M, 1989, 1992). Marks and Croson (1999) examined contri-
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butions to threshold public goods under uncertainty and incomplete information. They
found that the lack of information of the other group members’ valuation of the public
good had no impact on contributions to or the provision of the public good. McBride
(2006) examined public good contributions and determined that when there is uncer-
tainty regarding the threshold, if the public good is low valued then uncertainty leads to
fewer contributions; however, if the public good is high valued then uncertainty leads
to a greater level of contributions. Based on these findings and the similarities between
common-pool and public goods games, one would expect to see an impact on the lev-
els of withdrawal as a result of the threshold uncertainty. In 2013 Barrett examined
emissions abatement using a threshold public goods game both under cases of certainty
and uncertainty. Under threshold uncertainty, Barrett found that individuals abate (con-
tribute) less and individuals ignore catastrophic risks, “even when the risk is very great,”
(Barrett, 2013). Again, drawing a parallel between the CPR experiments and public
goods games, based on the results of Barrett (2013), under threshold uncertainty individ-
uals should withdraw greater quantities from the resource. While there are similarities
between CPR experiments and public goods games, nonetheless the effects of threshold
uncertainty do need to be addressed in a common-pool resource setting. The question of
unenforced policy targets has not yet been addressed in prior publications and also needs
to be addressed in a common-pool resource setting.
Some common-pool resource experiments study the effects of uncertainty on with-
drawal and depletion. However, these experiments only focus on uncertainty regarding
the size of the pool (Budescu et al., 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1990). When there is uncer-
tainty in the size of the pool, individuals overestimate the size and withdraw more coins
more rapidly. Having uncertainty with the size of CPR is very similar to an unknown
threshold. Therefore, based on these results, one would expect threshold uncertainty to
result in an increase in threshold withdrawal. The other uncertainty seen in common-
pool resource experiments is uncertainty of the payoff structure (Apesteguia, 2006). He
found that individual behavior was not significantly different in the case where the exact
payoff structure was revealed compared to the case where individuals were only told that
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their payoff would be dependent on the number of coins that they withdrew and the num-
ber of coins that others withdrew from the pool. Punishments have been examined and
seen to be an effective tool in both common-pool resource experiments and public goods
games for decreasing withdrawal from the common-pool or increasing contributions to
the public good (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Ostrom et al.,
1992; Wade, 1987). Ga¨chter in his 2007 paper studied the factors which motivate volun-
tary cooperation through laboratory and field public goods experiments. He was able to
eliminate the warm glow effect (Andreoni, 1990) and pure altruism as reasons for volun-
tary contribution, finding that more than half of the participants’ voluntary contributions
depend on the contributions of other group members. With voluntary contributors, the
greater the contributions to the public good of any one individual, the greater the contri-
butions from other members of the same group (Ga¨chter, 2007). Ga¨chter finds that with-
out punishment, conditional cooperation unravels (2007). Additional threshold public
goods games examined the relationship between fear, trust and individual contributions.
Lack of trust and fear that others would not contribute were two of the leading causes for
a lack of provision or under-provision of the public good (Rapoport, 1967; Dawes et al.,
1986; Yamagishi and Sato, 1986; Parks and Hulbert, 1995; DeCremer, 1999). Another
area of public goods and common-pool resource games which has been addressed is ex-
ternalities. Plott (1983), Walker and Gardner (1992) and Ostrom et al. (1992) found that
individuals tend to ignore externalities, meaning that the externality had no impact on
market behavior, with the resource rapidly becoming completed depleted at rates which
exceed the Nash-equilibrium prediction (Andreoni, 1995).
To date, no experimental approach regarding common-pool resources has incorporated
thresholds or unenforced policy targets. This paper addresses that gap in knowledge by
identifying the relative effect of continually readjusted targets and threshold uncertainty
on the longevity of a common-pool resource through the use of laboratory experiments.
Through these experiments I find that natural resources are best managed when policy
makers constantly inform resource users of the level of the common pool while also
making them aware that a threshold for consequences exists. I also found that there
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exist significant detrimental effects on the lifespans of common-pool resources when
polices and thresholds are not enforced; unenforced, moving policy targets result in a
significantly shorter common pool lifespan.
II. Experimental Design and Game Play
This experiment looks at how uncertainty with regard to the location of a threshold im-
pacts common-pool resource depletion. The experiment was implemented using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 1997). Sessions lasted close to an hour, including reading the Instructions
aloud. Individuals were randomly assigned to a group of five and placed at their own
computer terminal. Participants did not know the identities of the other members of
their group or those in other groups. Instructions were given to the participants and also
read aloud (see Appendix - Instructions). Subjects were informed that they would be
interacting with four other people in the laboratory.
Participants were able to withdraw up to twenty-five tokens a period from a common-
pool that initially had 1000 tokens. After each period, the pool recharged as a function
of the remaining tokens in the pool. When the number of tokens dropped below a certain
level, 327 tokens, the recharge stopped and individuals would be faced with a penalty, the
loss of 13 of their personal tokens. The game play continued until all withdrawing group
members, four individuals, could not withdraw their allotted twenty-five tokens (less than
100 tokens), or for an undisclosed amount of time.8 The number of periods of game play
represents the longevity of the common-pool resource. After completing the experiment,
individuals answered a brief questionnaire to reveal a few personal characteristics. At the
conclusion of the experiment they were paid $0.025 for each token in their private fund.
Using pilot study data and results from previous CPR experiments, this was calculated
so that participants would receive an average of 15 dollars.
There were three different treatments in this experiment: 1.)Threshold CPR with Com-
plete Threshold Information, 2.) Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Informa-
8Time limits were not disclosed to prevent end-game effects and ensure that the experiment did not continue forever.
For experimental treatments one and two, Complete Threshold Information and Incomplete Threshold Information, the
time limit was 35 minutes of play. Sporadically Enforced Targets, experimental treatment three, was given 45 minutes of
play. An additional 10 minutes were given to account for the actions required of the 5th player in this particular treatment.
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tion, and 3.)Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets.
A. Treatment 1- Threshold Common-Pool Resource Experiment With Complete Threshold
Information
In the first treatment, Threshold CPR with Complete Threshold Information, the groups
were informed of the location of the threshold, the point where recharge stopped and
individuals would lose one-third of their tokens. This game had four group members
interacting with each other (through computer terminals) and withdrawing tokens each
period from a common pool and a fifth player who sat out of the round. The fifth player
role rotated around the group, each player taking a turn sitting out (see Figure 1). The
fifth player sat out of the round to maintain consistency with the two other experimental
treatments in which the fifth player had another role. This treatment served as a control
in which the true threshold and policy target was revealed and would be enforced without
fail.
FIGURE 1.
Threshold CPR with Complete Threshold Information (experimental treatment 1). All players are informed of the true
threshold. One player sits out of the round while the other four players make their withdrawal decision. After
withdrawal and recharge, they all are informed of the resulting level of the common-pool.
B. Treatment 2 - Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Information
In the second treatment, Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Information, play-
ers were not given any information regarding the location of the threshold. They were
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only informed that the threshold existed. This game had four group members interact-
ing with each other and withdrawing tokens each period and a fifth player who revealed
their beliefs regarding the threshold location to the experimenter.9 These beliefs were
not shared with the other group members, but were recorded for analysis. The role of the
fifth player rotated each period. Although participants were not given information about
the threshold, they were given the size of the common-pool. Participants were given its
initial size and then were updated on its size after withdrawal and recharge at the begin-
ning of each period (see Figure 2). This treatment demonstrated the effects of allowing
individuals and groups to develop their own beliefs of the threshold on the lifespan of the
CPR when compared to the other experimental treatments, Complete Threshold Informa-
tion (the control) and Sporadically Enforced Targets. This treatment not only served as
a comparison against the other treatments, but its existence allowed for the development
of policy recommendations.
FIGURE 2.
Incomplete Threshold Information (experimental treatment 2). The fifth player develops beliefs as to the location of the
threshold while the four withdrawing players are deciding how many tokens to remove from the common pool. Then, all
players see the level of the common pool after withdrawal and recharge.
9Guesses of the threshold were restricted to be between the current size of the pool and 0.
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C. Treatment 3- Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets
The third and final treatment, Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets,
models a moving policy target with threshold uncertainty, as described in the real world
case of Israel’s “Red Line”. In this game the fifth member of the group played the role
of the policymaker. This role rotated among the group members and was reassigned
every period. At the beginning of each period the new policymaker announced to the
other players their guess of the threshold, or policy targets, via the software program.
The other four members then withdrew tokens as in the other two experimental treat-
ments. After withdrawal and recharge, the policymaker was informed of the level of the
common-pool, reminded of their guess of the location of the threshold, and then given an
option of enforcing their guess. The policymaker could pay 100 tokens to the common-
pool to enforce their guess of the threshold and inflict a punishment on all the players.
The punishment was a loss of 50 tokens from the private funds of the four withdraw-
ing players (see Figure 3). The changing policy targets in this treatment, as well as the
ability to leave the those policy targets unenforced, represented real world common-pool
resource situations, as illustrated in the Introduction.
D. Rationale
The punishment threshold was designed and implemented to represented the cross-
ing of an environmental threshold as well as the associated reduction in welfare and
well-being. Sporadically Enforced Targets was designed to closely match moving policy
targets resulting from the conflict between future resource use and bias for the present,
as illustrated in the example of the moving punishment threshold (“red line”) in Israel’s
main body of water. The rotating role of the policymaker and the existence of a cost to
punish and enforce the estimated threshold represents the conflict for the policymaker
of conservation, facing a cost today, versus uncontrolled consumption. Just as in the
real world case, the policymaker has the option to do nothing and pass the responsibility
to the next policymaker, which by not addressing over-consumption would jeopardize
the life of the common-pool. Since enforcing this punishment is costly and the role
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FIGURE 3.
Sporadically Enforced Targets (experimental treatment 3). The fifth player, the policymaker, makes an announced guess
of the threshold. The four with drawing players see the current level of the common pool and withdraw their desired
tokens. The policymaker can then enforce their guess of the threshold. After the policymaker makes their enforcement
decision all players see the level of the common pool after withdrawal, token contribution and recharge and they are
notified it they were punished by the policymaker or if they went below the threshold.
of policymaker will move to another player next period, the announced target or guess
of the threshold will move and the policymaker may choose to pass the responsibility
of enforcement to policymakers in future rounds. Alternatively, one could enforce the
predicted threshold or target to prevent individuals from withdrawing too many tokens,
which otherwise could result in ending the game more quickly and a large loss of per-
sonal tokens. If the punishment is enacted, then the public good is increased.10
10There are other reasons why a participant in the role of the policy maker would choose to not enforce their guess,
but either way the result is the same. The target or announced guess of the threshold changes with each policy maker and
if the target goes unenforced it will appear like the moving “red line” and other unenforced and constantly readjusting
common-pool resource management policies.
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III. Hypothesis and Theoretical Predictions
In this section I present theoretical predictions for individual and group behavior in this
experiment, as well as my hypotheses based on said predictions and previous findings in
the literature. I will discuss the optimal social planner solution and explain the conditions
under which that method of withdrawal will be sustainable as a Nash Equilibrium. I will
also introduce the Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium. Using a model, predictions will
be made about withdrawal and the level of the CPR under threshold uncertainty. A
discussion of my hypotheses will follow.
The optimal social planner solution for token withdrawal is a strategy of alternating be-
tween 58 and 55 tokens, an average of 57 tokens each period 11 (see Figure 4). This is the
greatest level of withdrawal which recharges the common-pool to full capacity. If partic-
ipants continue to withdraw at this level, the common-pool continually gets recharged to
full capacity while adding the maximum tokens to one’s private fund. The CPR remains
full and the game could go on forever in this fashion without crossing the threshold. Indi-
viduals within the group withdrawing on average 14.5 and 13.75 tokens in an alternating
manner is a Nash equilibrium solution.
Any strategy of taking out a greater number of tokens than the efficient amount (58 and
55 tokens) would result in a reduction in total earnings. After taking out more than the
optimal amount, one would have to decrease withdrawal for several periods to prevent
crossing the threshold, losing a significant fraction of one’s tokens, and limiting game
play. This decrease would offset any gain caused by the initial increase in withdrawal.
For example, if the group were to withdraw 100 tokens in the first period, instead of the
optimal 58, in order to prevent crossing the threshold the group would have to withdraw
11In a one hour session the greatest number of periods that one could play is approximately 200 periods. If one were to
look at the optimal solution for the similar 200 period finite threshold common-pool resource game, just as in the infinite
game described in this paper, it would be to alternate between 58 and 55 tokens. Since the game is finite one would
only do this for the first 188 periods. In period 189 the average group withdrawal would be 95 and then everyone would
withdraw their full token allotment of 25 tokens, for a total group withdrawal of 100 tokens in the last ten periods. This
results in an overall average withdrawal of 58.9. For the 200 period finite game Threshold CPR game this solution would
ensure that that threshold would not be crossed and the game would last all 200 periods, both of which make sure that all
participants total tokens are maximized. Alternating between 58 and 55 tokens for the majority of the game results in the
maximum number of tokens deposited in individuals private funds for the maximum number of periods both in finite and
infinite games.
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only 40 tokens in each of the next twelve periods. In the first period the group would
increase their earnings by 42 tokens, but as a result of the reduction in withdrawal over
the following twelve periods it would cost the group a total of 198 tokens. The initial
increase in token withdrawal would not have a net benefit in terms of overall payoff.
This is true for all strategies other than the alternating 58 and 55 tokens. With the op-
timal solution the pool initially decreases when 58 tokens are withdrawn, but it is then
immediately refilled the next period when only 55 tokens are withdrawn. Although the
threshold would not be crossed if any fewer than 58 or 55 tokens are withdrawn, this is
a non-optimal solution since a greater number of tokens could have been placed in all
individuals’ private funds by increasing withdrawal.
While the optimal social planner solution is to withdraw 58 and 55 tokens in an al-
ternating manner, the best response to the other group members withdrawing their full
endowment is for one to also withdraw their full endowment. This does ultimately de-
plete the common-pool and results in the group crossing the threshold, but under the
condition that the other group members are all withdrawing their full endowment, with-
drawing one’s full endowment maximizes one’s total payoff. All players withdrawing
their full endowment and depleting the resource is a Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium.
FIGURE 4.
Based on the recharge function, this graph displays the number of tokens which will be
added back to the common-pool after withdrawal (in blue). Taking recharge into
account, it also displays the total number of tokens that need be withdrawn from the
common-pool in order for the pool to have fewer tokens the next round (in red).
According to the theoretical model developed by Diekert (2014), when the threshold is
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known, maintaining the socially optimal level of withdrawal and not crossing the thresh-
old is dependent on the discount factor. When the threshold is sufficiently close to zero,
meaning that a large amount of the resource will have to be given up in order to make sure
that the threshold is not crossed, then the first-best outcome will be to cross threshold and
deplete the resource. If the threshold is sufficiently close to the size of the common-pool,
then the first-best solution is to withdraw exactly the amount which does not cause the
threshold to be crossed. How much one values the present or the future, one’s discount
factor, will determine what sufficient means. From Diekert (2014) the minimum discount
factor, β , needed to maintain the efficient, socially optimal solution is given by
β¯ = 1− u(α
iT)
u(R−N−1N T)
, where T is the Threshold, α i is an individual’s share of the
common-pool, R is the common-pool resource size, and N represents the number of
individuals.
Using this equation, as long as the discount factor is greater than 0.89, the social planner
level of withdrawal, alternating between 58 and 55 tokens, should be able to be sustained
when the threshold is known. In this experiment the discount factor is 1. Since β = 1 >
β¯ = 0.89, the social planner solution is a Nash equilibrium and can be sustained.
The social planner solution mentioned above, alternating between 58 and 55 tokens,
is a possible solution when the threshold is unknown. When making withdrawal deci-
sions the benefit from increasing withdrawal beyond that level must be balanced against
individuals’ beliefs that the threshold will be crossed. I will again refer to the theoretical
model developed by Diekert (2014) for when the threshold is unknown in a common-pool
resource. The boundaries on aggregate extraction (without the recharge) are defined by
the equations, s and s¯, given below
s = max
{
0, ((1−β )N+β )R−3βR(1−β )N
}
s¯ = min
{
((1−β )N+β )R
(1−β )N+3β ,R
}
,
where β is the discount factor, N is the number of individuals, and R is the size of the
resource.
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Using the parameters of this experiment, the first-best theoretical boundaries on aggre-
gate extraction without recharge are [0,333.33]. This means that the predicted first-best
common-pool level for Incomplete Threshold Information is between 1,000 tokens and
666.66 tokens or at the depletion equilibrium.
Although the theory does predict that groups will avoid crossing the threshold, these
predictions should be used merely as a comparison between how the Complete Threshold
Information groups and Incomplete Threshold Information groups will behave. It is
hypothesized, based on previous common-pool resource experiments, that groups will
deplete the CPR. The questions is, under the different experimental treatments, how
many periods will the resource last?
The three experimental treatments present various options to enable an evaluation of
the use and consequences of thresholds in the setting of a common-pool resource. The
expected result is that being given information which is constantly changing and unen-
forced, like the “red line” in the Kinneret in Israel (Threshold CPR with Sporadically En-
forced Targets), will result in the resource being depleted more quickly than the cases for
which there is either no announced threshold (Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold
Information) or a threshold that is announced (Threshold CPR with Complete Thresh-
old Information). This follows from previous literature, like that of Correˆa et al. (2014),
Bloch, Bhattacharya and Daouk, and Stormshak et al., where unenforced rules and reg-
ulations were found to result in more extreme and negative behaviors. This Hypothesis
is also drawn from studies which found that uncertainty results in common-pools being
depleted more rapidly (Budescu et al., 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1990). Additionally, the
results of Barrett’s threshold public goods game add to the justification of the hypothesis
that Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets will have a shorter common-
pool lifespan than Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Information or Threshold
CPR with Complete Threshold Information. Since Barrett’s results showed that uncer-
tainty resulted in fewer contributions to the public good and players ignoring catastrophic
events, it is predicted that the threshold and policy targets in a common-pool will also be
ignored, leading to the depletion of the resource.
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Based on the theoretical predictions above and the studies on uncertainty, it was hy-
pothesized that the uncertainty associated with the threshold in Incomplete Threshold
Information will result in more tokens being withdrawn and the CPR being depleted
more rapidly than in the Complete Threshold Information treatment. With the extra level
of uncertainty in Sporadically Enforced Targets, from both the target and the threshold,
it follows that the CPR will be depleted more quickly than the other two experimen-
tal treatments. Individuals will have to weigh the benefit of increasing their withdrawal
above the safe group level, 58 or 55 tokens, against the potential cost of crossing a policy
target and having it enforced in addition to the possibility of crossing the threshold.
It was also hypothesized that policy makers would not enforce their policy targets
(guesses of the threshold). This also follows from the results of Barrett. Since the conse-
quences of crossing the threshold would likely be ignored, individuals would not enforce
their policy targets. Another justification is that since the cost of punishment is great and
the role of the policy maker rotates, participants would not enforce their policy targets
and would instead leave the role of enforcement to the next policy maker.
IV. Results and Discussion
The experiment was conducted at the University of California, Santa Barbara’s Ex-
perimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory. There were 180 participants from the
University of California, Santa Barbara’s undergraduate population. In each experimen-
tal treatment, each consisting of 5 members, there were 12 groups. Average earnings
were approximately $15, including a $5 show-up fee.
The results sections is divided into four sections. I begin by discussing the Lifespan of
the Common-Pool Resource across the three different experimental treatment groups. I
then support my findings by examining the Total Token Withdrawal From the Common-
Pool Resource. Next, I discuss the Over Withdrawal and Depletion of the common-pool.
Finally, in Pre-Threshold and Post-Threshold Behavior individual withdrawal behavior
before the is crossed is compared to their post-threshold behavior. There are four major
results:
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• Sporadically Enforced Targets, when non-credibly enforced, results in a signifi-
cantly shorter common-pool lifespan.
• A greater number of tokens is indicative of a greater number of periods of game
play.
• Sporadically Enforced Targets results in a significantly fewer number of indi-
vidual tokens upon the completion of the game.
• The majority of groups withdrew tokens in excess of the optimal strategy.
A. Lifespan of the Common-Pool Resource
In these games, extending the number of rounds played serves as a measure of con-
servation of the common-pool resource. Table 1 displays the number of periods that the
game lasted, the longevity of the common-pool.
In all three experimental treatments there was one group which was considered sustain-
able.12 The sustainable groups were withdrawing close to the optimal amount of tokens,
an average of 57 total tokens or less.13,14 This resulted in the common-pool remaining
in the 900-1000 token range for the majority of the game, removing a few tokens each
round and then getting recharged with very little downwards motion. Continuing this
process, these groups would be able to play indefinitely, creating a sustainable resource.
The average number of periods of play, including only the non-sustainable groups, was
51, 45.6 and 29.9 for the Complete Threshold Information, Incomplete Threshold In-
formation and Sporadically Enforced Target experimental treatments, respectively. The
time paths of the common-pools for the three treatments is presented in Figures 5 - 7.
Since the variable of interest, the number of periods until depletion, is at the group
level, counting this event results in a very small number of observations, yielding only
12The sustainable groups are denoted with an asterisk (*) in Table 1.
13The Social Planner Optimal Strategy is alternating between withdrawing 58 tokens and 55 tokens, averaging 57
tokens throughout the game.
14The optimal number of tokens was calculated using the recharge function. This is the greatest amount of tokens
which can be withdrawn while allowing the common-pool to get recharged at the maximum amount and continue to
remain full.
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TABLE 1—LONGEVITY OF THE COMMON-POOL BY EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT. EACH NUMBER REPRESENTS
THE NUMBER OF PERIODS OF GAME PLAY BEFORE THE COMMON POOL WAS DEPLETED. THE ASTERISK (*)
DENOTES GROUPS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED SUSTAINABLE AND DID NOT DEPLETE THE COMMON POOL. THE
(+)DENOTES THAT THE AVERAGE EXCLUDES THE SUSTAINABLE GROUPS.
Longevity of Common-Pool By Treatment: Number of Periods of Play
Threshold CPR with Threshold CPR with Threshold CPR with
Complete Threshold Information Incomplete Threshold Information Sporadically Enforced Targets
67 25 25
25 109 33
14 26 33
43 21 21
41 36 33
200 24 25
19 24 25
31 ∞* 58
∞* 23 28
43 106 23
54 88 ∞*
24 20 25
Average : 51+ 45.6+ 29.9+
Standard Deviation : 51.9 36.2 10.2
twelve observations in each experimental treatment ranging from values of fourteen to
200 as well as three sustainable groups. Therefore the data was sorted into bins for further
evaluation, which limits the effect of variation in the data. The bins were determined by
quartiles. The data was recoded as 1 if it fell in the first quartile, 2 if it fell in the second
quartile, and so on. The sustainable groups, however, were collected into a fifth bin and
recoded as a 5 to distinguish them from the groups which depleted the resource.
After putting the data into bins, one-tailed Mood’s median tests were performed to test
hypotheses that the treatment samples were drawn from populations with equal medi-
ans.15,16 First, Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Information was tested against
Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets. However, the case of interest was
15This test was chosen since it is a non-parametric test and it handles data that has large observations, like the sustain-
able groups, particularly well (Siegel, 1956). One-tailed tests are justified by my hypotheses.
16Lemeshko,Chimitova, and Kolesnikov (2007) showed there are “no evident problems” with testing hypotheses using
non-parametric tests in cases of grouped data.
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FIGURE 5.
Level of tokens remaining in the common pool each period, by group, before the
common pool is depleted under Complete Threshold Information.
the one where there was no credible enforcement of the guess of the threshold. It was
hypothesized that since the cost of punishment was large, the task of enforcement would
be passed on to the next round’s policymaker. Yet this was not always the case.
Of the twelve groups who played Sporadically Enforced Targets, six fall into the cate-
gory of non-credible enforcement, punishing the other members of their group one time
or less (four groups did not punish at all and two groups only punished once) and six fall
into the category of credible enforcement. Those groups which made credible threats of
punishment, as defined by punishing two or more times, punished throughout the game–
in early rounds and then in later rounds as well. A median test was conducted comparing
the non-credible enforcement subgroup to the credible enforcement subgroup, resulting
in a fisher exact p-value of 0.008, indicating that there is a significant difference in the
longevity of the CPR between credibly enforced and non-credibly enforced subgroups
from the Sporadically Enforced Targets experimental treatment. The sustainable group
fell into the credible enforcement subgroup. Subgroup analysis was carried out using
the two distinct Sporadically Enforced Targets subgroups. Conducting a median test on
Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Information against the non-credible enforce-
ment subgroup of Sporadically Enforced Targets yielded a fisher exact p-value of 0.092;
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FIGURE 6.
Level of tokens remaining in the common pool from each period, by group, before the
common pool is depleted under Incomplete Information.
there is a significant difference between the two treatments’ common pool lifespans at the
10% level. When the policymakers from Sporadically Enforced Targets made credible
threats of enforcement of their guesses, there was no significant difference between any
of the treatments; median tests resulted in Fisher Exact p-value of 0.439 when conducted
against Threshold CPR with Complete Threshold Information and Threshold CPR with
Incomplete Threshold Information. There is no significant difference between Thresh-
old CPR with Complete Threshold Information and Incomplete Threshold Information,
with a chi-squared value of 0.6667 with one degree of freedom and a p-value of 0.414.
Comparing Complete Threshold Information to the non-credible enforcement subgroup
yielded results which were significantly different, Fisher Exact p-value of 0.025. How-
ever, when Sporadically Enforced Targets was credibly enforced, there was no significant
difference between Complete Threshold Information and the credible enforced subgroup
of Sporadically Enforced Targets, Fisher Exact p-value of 0.439.
As long as threshold information was available that could be relied upon when making
one’s withdrawal decision, either from one’s own beliefs or given from a policymaker,
there was no negative effect on the life of the common-pool resource. However, being
given extra information in some cases can become detrimental to the life of the common-
pool. In the case of Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets, when the poli-
cymakers shared their guess of the location of the threshold, the extra information may
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FIGURE 7.
Level of tokens remaining in the common pool from each period, by group, before the
common pool is depleted under sporadically enforced targets.
crowd out the individual responsibility to develop players’ own beliefs. It appeared that
each participant only made their guess every fifth turn when they were assigned the role
of the policymaker. When the policymakers did not enforce the guess, having developed
no belief of their own, the participants were left with no information which they believed
to be credible when making their decision for how many tokens to withdraw. This is a
possible explanation for the significant difference between Threshold CPR with Incom-
plete Threshold Information and Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets,
especially when looking at the groups faced with non-credible enforcement.
With Incomplete Information, individuals developed their own beliefs, being told only
that there is a threshold of negative consequences and individuals were prompted to guess
on their own by telling the experimenter their guess when not withdrawing, but never
sharing it with the group. Those groups in Sporadically Enforced Targets which made
credible threats of punishment had information which had to be taken as reliable or risked
getting punished again in the future.17 The groups in Sporadically Enforced Targets
which did enforce their guesses, through punishment and credible threats of punishment,
relied upon the information which they were given, the guesses of the threshold (targets),
17This is consistent with the punishment literature which shows that when implemented, punishment is effective at
conserving a common-pool resource(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992).
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and used that to determine how many tokens to withdrawal each period. Not having
information which one could rely upon resulted in a significant reduction in the number
of periods of game play and the lifespan of the common-pool resource.
Lack of trust is one of the main causes of under-provision of public goods and would
therefore imply that lack of trust in a common-pool resource setting would lead to a
greater level of withdrawal and a shorter common-pool lifespan (Rapoport, 1967; Dawes
et al., 1986; Yamagishi and Sato, 1986; Parks and Hulbert, 1995; DeCremer, 1999).
While trust was not directly measured, the constant lowering of targets and announced
guesses combined with non-credible enforcement would be a strong contributor to a
general lack of trust within Sporadically Enforced Target groups.
Interestingly, there was no benefit in terms of the length of the life of the common-
pool resource from giving participants the additional information as to where the true
threshold was located. While counter-intuitive and conflicts with the hypothesis, this
can be attributed to some individuals having present biased preferences. Individuals
knew of the level of 327 as threshold, but appeared unwilling to give up tokens in the
current round and continued to withdraw tokens at higher than optimal levels, likely
thinking that they would withdraw fewer tokens the next period as they moved closer
to the threshold and to the pending punishment. Every period players went through
the same thought process, opting to maximize their private fund in the current period
and withdrawing more than the optimal amount of tokens, in hopes of conserving the
common-pool resource the next period.18 The benefit of additional information could
be canceled out by individuals’ present biased preferences and the knowledge that they
have time in the future to take fewer tokens before hitting the threshold. This explains
not only why there may not be any added benefit from Complete Threshold Information
over Incomplete Threshold Information, but it also can give another reason as to how the
common-pool resource is depleted in under full information.
Although the hypothesis that Complete Threshold Information would have the great-
18This follows the idea of present-biased preferences described by O’Donoghue and Rabin(1999) in “Doing it Now or
Later.”
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est common-pool lifespan was not confirmed, other hypotheses were proved accurate
within this experiment. Threshold Information Sporadically Enforced Targets, when
non-credibly enforced, had a significantly shorter common-pool lifespan than the other
two experimental treatments. The hypothesis that the common-pool would be depleted
was shown to be correct, in contrast to the theoretical predictions, with 33 of 36 groups
depleting the CPR.
• Result 1. Sporadically Enforced Targets, when non-credibly enforced, results in
a significantly shorter common-pool lifespan. Common-pool resource lifespans
increase by providing individuals with reliable information about the current
size of the resource and the location of the threshold (their own beliefs or given
information).
B. Token Withdrawal from the Common-Pool Resource
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL TOTAL TOKEN WITHDRAWAL BY EXPERIMENT.
Summary of Individual Total Tokens
Mean Standard Deviation
Threshold CPR with Complete Threshold Information 541.7 699.8
Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Information 409.0 307.5
Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets 239.3 138.7
Examining the total token withdrawal by individuals at the completion of the game
reveals a strong positive correlation, r = 0.8175, between earnings and lifespan of the
common-pool (see Figure 8). To make sure that post-threshold behavior and the pun-
ishment was not playing a major role, the pre-threshold relationship was also examined.
This, too, showed a strong positive correlation with r = 0.8253(see Figure 9). The longer
the lifespan of the common-pool, the more opportunities to earn tokens. From this, one
can infer that earning more tokens is indicative of increased lifespan of the common-pool.
As verification, all individuals were placed in bins according to the length of game
play. The top earners who played the most periods were compared to the top earners
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who played the fewest periods, with average earnings of 1498.5 and 236.4 respectively.
These two groups were compared using a rank sum test, resulting in a test statistic of
-4.828, which is significant at the 1% level. This shows that the top earners did come
from the groups who played the greatest number of periods and were able to maximize
the lifespan of the common-pool. Therefore, one is able to conclude that more tokens
also represent a longer lifespan of the CPR.
All players’ total token withdrawal is another tool for comparing the lifespan of the
CPR under the various conditions of the different treatments.The average total token
withdrawal by treatment can be seen in Table 2. Even with a larger sample size, normality
cannot be assumed (see Figure 10) so the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, a non-parametric
test, was used to compare total tokens across the different treatments (Siegel, 1956).
Conducting a Rank-Sum test on the Complete Threshold Information level of total tokens
against the Sporadically Enforced Targets level of total tokens generated a test statistic
of z = 3.328; Sporadically Enforced Targets had significantly fewer total tokens than
Complete Threshold Information at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0009). A Rank-Sum test
on the Incomplete Threshold Information level of total tokens against the Sporadically
Enforced Targets level of total tokens yielded a test statistic of z = 3.052 and found
that Sporadically Enforced Targets had significantly fewer total tokens than Incomplete
Threshold Information at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0023). A Rank-Sum test on the
Incomplete Threshold Information level of total tokens against the Complete Threshold
Information level of total tokens results in a test statistic of z = 0.192, confirming our
earlier results that there is no significant difference between Complete and Incomplete
Threshold Information (p-value = 0.8481).
Since those who played the Sporadically Enforced Targets earned fewer tokens and
fewer tokens are indicative of a shorter CPR lifespan, these findings support the previous
results, that is, Sporadically Enforced Targets results in a reduction of the lifespan of
a CPR. The Complete Threshold Information common-pool lifespan had no significant
gains over Incomplete Threshold Information. Information regarded as reliable whether
provided or based on one’s own beliefs presents no harm to the life of the common-pool.
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All information which is perceived as reliable has significant gains over sporadically
enforced targets.
Not only do these results support previous findings, but they also support experimental
hypotheses. Those who played Sporadically Enforced Targets earned fewer individual
total tokens than those who played under Complete Threshold Information or Incom-
plete Threshold Information. Since a greater number of tokens is indicative of a greater
number of periods of game play, this shows that those who played Sporadically Enforced
Targets played a fewer number of periods.
• Result 2. A greater number of tokens in players’ private funds is indicative of a
greater number of periods of game play.
• Result 3. Sporadically Enforced Targets results in a significantly fewer number
of individual tokens upon the completion of the game, when compared to both
Complete and Incomplete Threshold Information. Combining these findings
with Result 2, Result 1 is further supported. Therefore, not only do individual
earnings increase by providing individuals with reliable information about the
current size of the resource and the location of the threshold (given information
or their own beliefs), but common-pool resource lifespans increase as well.
C. Over Withdrawal and Depletion
Despite the theoretical predictions, the majority of all groups, 77.7%, over extracted
the resource compared to the optimal level, withdrawing more than the optimal amount
of 58 and 55 tokens. The average amount of withdrawal was 66.5 tokens per period (see
Table 3). Half of the groups given Complete Threshold Information withdrew more than
the optimal level. The average withdrawal was 61.7 tokens and was just over the 57
average optimal tokens. This is in contrast to the theoretical predictions, which posited
that since discount factor was greater that 0.89, the socially optimal level of withdrawal
would be able to be sustained. Under Completed Threshold Information only one group
failed to cross the threshold, withdrawing close to the socially optimally level. It was hy-
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FIGURE 8.
Scatter Plot showing the strong positive relationship, r = 0.8175, between total tokens
earned per individual at the end of the game and Periods played. (N=130)
pothesized that the common-pool lifespan for Incomplete Threshold Information would
be significantly shorter than under Complete Threshold Information. The model from
Diekert (2014) predicted that the common pool level would be greater than 666 tokens.
Incomplete Threshold Information had an average withdrawal of 66.5 with 88.3% of
groups on average over withdrawing. As with Complete Threshold Information, only
one group from Incomplete Threshold Information failed to cross the threshold. This
treatment did have a greater average level of withdrawal and a greater percentage of
group withdrawing in excess of the optimal level. Sporadically Enforced Targets had an
even higher average token withdrawal, 71.3, with 100% of groups on average having ex-
cess withdrawal. The percentages of groups withdrawing in excess of the optimal level
are significantly different.
Using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, the average group levels of withdrawal were com-
pared to one another as well as looking at the groups from each experimental treatment
that exceeded the optimal level. There was a significant difference between the Com-
plete Threshold Information and Incomplete Threshold Information at the 10% level (z
= -1.674 p=0.09). At the 1% level ( z = -2.483 p=0.0130), there was a significant differ-
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FIGURE 9.
Scatter Plot showing the strong positive relationship, r = 0.8253, between total tokens
earned per individual the last period before crossing the threshold and periods played.
(N=130)
ence between average withdrawal of those groups who played the Sporadically Enforced
Target experimental treatment and those who played under Complete Threshold Infor-
mation. While no significant difference was seen in comparing the average withdrawal,
there was a significant difference in the number of groups whose average withdrawal
exceeded the optimal level. Comparing the groups exceeding the socially optimally level
of extraction from Complete Threshold Information to the number of groups exceed-
ing the socially optimal level of extraction from Sporadically Enforced Targets, using
a rank sum test, results in a z-statistic of z = 2.769 and a p-value of 0.0056; there is
a significant difference at the 1% level. There was also a significant difference in the
number of groups withdrawing in excess of the socially optimal level when comparing
Complete Threshold Information to Incomplete Threshold Information (z = 1.696 p =
0.0900). Finally, there was also a significant different at the 10% level (z = 1.813 0 =
0.0699) when comparing the number of groups that had excess withdrawal between the
Incomplete Threshold Information and Sporadically Enforced Targets treatment. This
matches with the hypothesis that Sporadically Enforced Targets would have a shorter
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FIGURE 10.
Distribution of Individual Total Tokens showing the distribution of total tokens is
positively skewed.
common-pool lifespan that Complete Threshold Information or Incomplete Threshold
Information, meaning they would have greater levels of withdrawal and withdrawal in
excess of the optimal amount.
The common-pool resource was overwhelmingly depleted in all three experimental
treatments. Only three groups received the label of “sustainable.” All other groups de-
pleted the resource. While 22% of groups did have an average withdrawal which was at
or below the optimal level, with the majority coming from the Complete Threshold In-
formation treatment, these groups were not able to maintain this level of withdrawal. As
seen in Figure 5 - Figure 7 showing the number of tokens remaining in the CPR, groups
would start off withdrawing an optimal or close to optimal amount and then one or more
group members would want more tokens, collapsing all group cooperation. When groups
were cooperating, the level of tokens in the pool remained close to 1000. Eventually, the
groups which were withdrawing close to the optimal level of withdrawal would deplete
the CPR. The groups which cooperated for longer periods were able to keep the CPR
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close to 1000 tokens the longest. Some groups would over withdraw in initial rounds,
decreasing the size of the common-pool. In this event, even if a group were to adopt
the strategy of withdrawing 58 and 55 tokens in a later round, it would no longer be the
strategy which would result in returning the CPR to full capacity. Many groups with-
drew tokens in excess of the optimal 58-55 token solution, in favor of the Pareto inferior
solution. Due to excess withdrawal, the CPR was depleted in all three experimental
treatments with the exception of one sustainable group in each treatment.
• Result 4. The majority of groups, 77.8%, withdrew tokens in excess of the opti-
mal strategy. Over-withdrawal resulted in 33 of 36 groups depleting the CPR.
TABLE 3—AVERAGE GROUP TOKEN WITHDRAWAL.
Average Group Percentage Of Groups
Token Withdrawal with Average Above Optimal
Threshold CPR with Complete Threshold Information 61.7 50
Threshold CPR with Incomplete Threshold Information 66.5 83.3
Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets 71.3 100
All Groups 66.5 77.8
D. Pre-Threshold and Post-Threshold Behavior
Before crossing the threshold individuals were withdrawing tokens at levels signif-
icantly below their 25 token maximum allowances. This can be seen in Figure 11 in
which the two periods prior to the threshold being crossed are examined. Two periods
before the threshold was crossed the average amount of tokens withdrawn by an individ-
ual was 14.25. One period before the threshold was crossed the average withdrawal was
16.15 tokens. After the threshold was crossed and recharge to the common-pool ceased,
individuals withdrew more tokens for their private fund. The number of individuals who
were withdrawing their full allotted 25 tokens more than doubled and the average with-
drawal increased to 21.6, 21.57, and 22.05 for the first, second and third period after
the threshold was crossed, respectively. Once recharge was terminated by crossing the
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threshold, there no longer existed an incentive to slowly withdraw tokens from the CPR.
Individuals entered into a race with their group members to deplete the resource. If one
did not take their full 25 tokens then another player could withdraw the remaining tokens
for their private fund (while remaining within their 25 token limit). Previously there was
an incentive to leaving tokens in the common-pool, but without recharge that incentive
is non-existent. If players do not put tokens into their private fund, another player will.
Tokens will not remain in the common-pool.
FIGURE 11.
Individual token withdrawal pre-threshold and post-threshold shows an increase in
withdrawal once the threshold is crossed.
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V. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
A. Conclusion
Common-pool resources can have a threshold for consequences. In order to delay re-
source users from crossing this threshold, policymakers set their own targets which they
claim will be enforced. However, the policy maker’s targets are repeatedly readjusted
with no enforcement. In the laboratory, this process of Sporadically Enforced Targets
resulted in a reduction of the common-pool resource lifespan and decreased profits. Due
to the constant readjustment, individuals were not able to rely on the information they
were given. Without reliable information, individuals made decisions which shortened
the common-pool life. However, when individuals weren’t given any target information
at all, they developed their own beliefs which acted as reliable information. Any reli-
able information, either given or from one’s own beliefs, provided significant gains over
Sporadically Enforced Targets both in terms of individual gains and the lifespan of the
common-pool resource.
While this paper is the first to examine threshold common-pool resources with uncer-
tainty in an experimental setting, the findings built on previous literature. The shorter
common-pool lifespan exhibited under Sporadically Enforced Targets resulting from a
lack of enforcement and uncertainty of the punishment threshold is consistent with the
unraveling of conditional cooperation in the absence of punishment (Ga¨chter, 2007).
Also consistent with the punishment literature (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Nikiforakis and
Normann, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992; Wade, 1987), when punishments and policy targets
were enforced they were an effective tool for reducing individual withdrawal from the
common-pool resource and increasing its longevity. In contrast, when left unenforced
they increased resource use and decreased the resource lifespan.
Previous literature with uncertainty within common-pool resources focused on uncer-
tainty in the resource size, finding that users withdrew greater amounts of the resource
more rapidly (Budescu et al., 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1990). In contrast to the literature
and the theoretical model of Diekert (2014), when uncertainty was placed on a pun-
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ishment threshold, as in the Incomplete Threshold Information experimental treatment,
there was no significant difference in individual token withdrawal or common-pool lifes-
pan when compared against the treatment without uncertainty, the Complete Threshold
Information experimental treatment. But when there was a greater degree of uncertainty,
as with Sporadically Enforced Targets, individuals withdrew more tokens, more rapidly
depleting the CPR when the threshold as well as the policy targets involved elements of
uncertainty.
Threshold uncertainty in CPRs results in resource users consuming the resource in
excess of the optimal level and depleting the resource more quickly than they would in
cases of full information in regards to the threshold. Sporadically Enforced Targets, when
non-credibly enforced, results in both a shorter common-pool lifespan and decreased
earnings. Providing individuals with reliable information about the size of the CPR and
the location of the threshold (given information or their own beliefs) will result in both
economic gains and resource preservation.
B. Policy Recommendations
In order to effectively conserve a threshold common-pool resource and maximize its
lifespan, policymakers should make resource users aware that a threshold exists and of
the size of the common-pool. While one might argue that making the resource users
aware of the location of the threshold should be the recommended policy, that would
not be advisable in a real world situation. My findings indicate that addition of true,
reliable information beyond one’s own beliefs had no significant gains in the lifespan
of the common-pool resource. Additionally, due to governmental present-biased prefer-
ences (Horowitz, 1996), announced targets and estimates of threshold locations cannot
be permanently and irrevocably established. For this reason these estimates (targets) will
often get readjusted, resulting in a situation in which a real world Complete Threshold
Information case will morph into a situation much like the Sporadically Enforced Tar-
gets case. Since threshold common-pool resources under Sporadically Enforced Targets
had a significantly shorter lifespan and produced smaller individual earning than when
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individuals were able to rely on their beliefs alone, I determined that if one cannot count
on announced targets or policies to be credible, the best policy would be one in which in-
dividuals developed their own beliefs. My findings support the notion that governments
and policymakers should be more firm with thresholds that they set, while also demon-
strating that a threshold which is unenforced is more detrimental than no threshold at
all.
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
A1. Threshold Common-Pool Resource Experiment with Complete Threshold Information
Instructions
If you have any questions as we go through these instructions, please raise your hand
and one of the monitors will come and answer your question.
In this game, you will have the opportunity to earn cash rewards. The amount that
you earn will depend upon the independent decisions that you make and also upon the
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independent decisions that the others in your group make. You will receive a minimum
of $5 for showing up and participating. You will be playing with tokens on the computer.
Each token is worth $0.025 and your earnings are dependent on how many tokens you
collect into your private fund. The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the
more money you earn, so it is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your
pay, while avoiding penalties that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
Each of you has been randomly assigned to a group of 5 members. All members of
your group are in this room. However, there is no communication or collaboration among
the members of your group, and all decisions are made independently.
Each group will start with a shared, common pool of 1000 tokens. The roles of each
of 5 players will rotate around the group each round, similar to changing the dealer in
a game of cards. In each round there will be 4 group members who are withdrawing
tokens. The 5th member will sit out of the round.
When you are in the role of a withdrawing player, each round provides the oppor-
tunity to collect tokens from the common pool and increase your private fund. After
all members have completed the round, the common pool will get partially refilled or
“recharged,” by the computer, which will add more tokens back to the common pool to-
tal. The more tokens left in the common pool at the end of a round, the more additional
tokens get added back to recharge and refill the pool. Similarly, the fewer tokens left in
the common pool at the end of a round, the fewer additional tokens get added back to
recharge and refill the pool. This is similar to earning interest or a reward based on the
amount of tokens in the common pool. There is an opportunity to keep the common pool
large which would allow more rounds of play to increase your private fund.
However, if the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low - drops below
327 tokens - there will be negative consequences for all group members. This is similar
to a requirement to maintain a minimum account balance in the common pool. If the
common pool drops below the threshold of 327, for the rest of the game there will be
no recharge - the pool will not be refilled after each round - and, in addition, each group
member will lose 13 of the tokens on hand in their private fund.
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When you are one of the 4 withdrawing players, you individually decide how many
tokens you would like to withdraw from the common pool to add to your private fund,
knowing that the other players are doing the same. You will be shown the current num-
ber of tokens in the common pool and the maximum number of tokens which you can
remove. You are allowed to take out from 0 up to 25 tokens each round. You will enter
the desired number in the box on the computer screen and then click the “OK” button.
The other members of your group will also be making their own independent with-
drawal decisions. The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed
in your private fund and are not available to other members, and likewise, the tokens
withdrawn by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private
funds and are not available to you.
After all members have taken their desired tokens from the common pool, as long as
the common pool remains above the 327 token threshold, the pool will get recharged. At
the conclusion of the round, after all 4 players have chosen their amount of withdrawal,
a screen will display the total number of tokens currently in the common pool and the
number of tokens collected into your private fund.
If at the end of the round, the number of tokens in the common pool is too low and
is below the threshold, all group members will be notified on the computer screen, they
will all lose 13 of their private fund tokens, and recharge of the common pool will cease.
If the threshold has not been reached, play continues for the next round as before.
A new round will start with the jobs rotated, and a different player will sit out of
the round. Then the 4 withdrawing members will make their independent decisions for
withdrawal from the common pool, from 0 to 25 tokens. As before, the size of the pool
and the total number of tokens in your private fund will be displayed. Play will continue
until the common pool level is “broke” - so small that all withdrawing members cannot
withdraw their maximum allotment.
All decisions will be kept anonymous. The number of tokens in your private fund at
the end of the experiment will determine your earnings. Each token in your private fund
will be converted to 2.5 cents.
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Remember:
• 1 token = $0.025
• You will receive a show-up payment of $5
• You withdraw 0 to 25 tokens each period from the common pool that is available to
all players
• When the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low, below the 327
tokens:
• Recharge to the pool STOPS for the rest of the game
•All group members lose 13 of their tokens 111111111
• The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it
is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties
that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed in your private
fund and are no longer available to other members, and likewise, the tokens withdrawn
by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private funds and are
no longer available to you.
A2. Threshold Common-Pool Resource Experiment with Incomplete Threshold Information
Instructions
Instructions:
If you have any questions as we go through these instructions, please raise your hand
and one of the monitors will come and answer your question.
In this game, you will have the opportunity to earn cash rewards. The amount that
you earn will depend upon the independent decisions that you make and also upon the
independent decisions that the others in your group make. You will receive a minimum
of $5 for showing up and participating. Most people earn $15 on average. You will
be playing with tokens on the computer. Each token is worth $0.025 and your earnings
are dependent on how many tokens you collect into your private fund. The more tokens
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you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it is in your interest to
accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties that will cause you to
lose tokens and decrease your pay.
Each of you has been randomly assigned to a group of 5 members. All members of
your group are in this room. However, there is no communication or collaboration among
the members of your group, and all decisions are made independently.
Each group will start with a shared, common pool of 1000 tokens. The roles of each
of 5 players will rotate around the group each round, similar to changing the dealer in
a game of cards. In each round there will be 4 group members who are withdrawing
tokens. The 5th member will play the role of a policy maker and will have a different
task at the beginning of each round, just like the dealer has a different role in card games.
When you are in the role of a withdrawing player, each round provides the oppor-
tunity to collect tokens from the common pool and increase your private fund. After
all members have completed the round, the common pool will get partially refilled or
“recharged,” by the computer, which will add more tokens back to the common pool to-
tal. The more tokens left in the common pool at the end of a round, the more additional
tokens get added back to recharge and refill the pool. Similarly, the fewer tokens left in
the common pool at the end of a round, the fewer additional tokens get added back to
recharge and refill the pool. This is similar to earning interest or a reward based on the
amount of tokens in the common pool. There is an opportunity to keep the common pool
large which would allow more rounds of play to increase your private fund.
However, if the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low - drops below
a certain threshold - there will be negative consequences for all group members. This is
similar to a requirement to maintain a minimum account balance in the common pool.
If the common pool drops below the threshold, for the rest of the game there will be no
recharge - the pool will not be refilled after each round - and, in addition, each group
member will lose 13 of the tokens on hand in their private fund. The game changing
threshold amount is not revealed to the group members, until after the number of tokens
in the common pool is less than the threshold.
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At the beginning of each round, the policy maker will secretly make an official guess
for the location of the threshold. This will be done on the computer, entering the number
of tokens in the common pool believed to be the threshold where the negative conse-
quences will go into effect. For example, if the policy maker enters “999” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 999 tokens, recharge will
stop and everyone will lose 13 of their tokens. If the policy maker enters “3” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 3 tokens, recharge will stop
and everyone will lose 13 of their tokens. Of course, the policy maker may not choose a
threshold higher than the number of tokens currently in the pool. While each guess of
the value of the threshold is stored in the computer and is linked to the policy maker, it
is secret and not revealed to other members of the group.
When you are one of the 4 withdrawing players, you may guess for yourself, if you
wish, where you think the threshold might be, and then individually decide how many
tokens you would like to withdraw from the common pool to add to your private fund,
knowing that the other players are doing the same. You will be shown the current num-
ber of tokens in the common pool and the maximum number of tokens which you can
remove. You are allowed to take out from 0 up to 25 tokens each round. You will enter
the desired number in the box on the computer screen and then click the “OK” button.
The other members of your group will also be making their own independent with-
drawal decisions. The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed
in your private fund and are not available to other members, and likewise, the tokens
withdrawn by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private
funds and are not available to you.
After all members have taken their desired tokens from the common pool, as long as
the common pool remains above the actual threshold, the pool will get recharged. At the
conclusion of the round, after all 4 players have chosen their amount of withdrawal and
5th player has made entered their secret guess of the threshold, a screen will display the
total number of tokens currently in the common pool and the number of tokens collected
into your private fund.
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If at the end of the round, the number of tokens in the common pool is too low and
is below the threshold, all group members will be notified on the computer screen, they
will all lose 13 of their private fund tokens, and recharge of the common pool will cease.
If the threshold has not been reached, play continues for the next round as before.
A new round will start with the jobs rotated, and a different player in the role of policy
maker, making a secret guess of the threshold. Then the 4 withdrawing members will
make their independent decisions for withdrawal from the common pool, from 0 to 25
tokens. As before, the size of the pool and the total number of tokens in your private
fund will be displayed. Play will continue until the common pool level is “broke” - so
small that all withdrawing members cannot withdraw their maximum allotment.
All decisions will be kept anonymous. The number of tokens in your private fund at
the end of the experiment will determine your earnings. Each token in your private fund
will be converted to 2.5 cents.
Remember:
• 1 token = $0.025
• You will receive a show-up payment of $5
• You withdraw 0 to 25 tokens each period from the common pool that is available to
all players
• Each round a rotating policy maker makes a secret official guess of the value of the
threshold
• When the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low, below the thresh-
old:
• Recharge to the pool STOPS for the rest of the game
• All group members lose 13 of their tokens 111111111
• The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it
is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties
that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
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The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed in your private
fund and are no longer available to other members, and likewise, the tokens withdrawn
by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private funds and are
no longer available to you.
A3. Threshold Common-Pool Resource Experiment with Sporadically Enforced Targets
Instructions
Instructions:
If you have any questions as we go through these instructions, please raise your hand
and one of the monitors will come and answer your question.
In this game, you will have the opportunity to earn cash rewards. The amount that
you earn will depend upon the independent decisions that you make and also upon the
independent decisions that the others in your group make. You will receive a minimum
of $5 for showing up and participating. You will be playing with tokens on the computer.
Each token is worth $0.025 and your earnings are dependent on how many tokens you
collect into your private fund. The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the
more money you earn, so it is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your
pay, while avoiding penalties that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
Each of you has been randomly assigned to a group of 5 members. All members of
your group are in this room. However, there is no communication or collaboration among
the members of your group, and all decisions are made independently.
Each group will start with a shared, common pool of 1000 tokens. The roles of each
of 5 players will rotate around the group each round, similar to changing the dealer in
a game of cards. In each round there will be 4 group members who are withdrawing
tokens. The 5th member will play the role of a policy maker and will have a different
task at the beginning of each round, just like the dealer has a different role in card games.
When you are in the role of a withdrawing player, each round provides the oppor-
tunity to collect tokens from the common pool and increase your private fund. After
all members have completed the round, the common pool will get partially refilled or
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“recharged,” by the computer, which will add more tokens back to the common pool to-
tal. The more tokens left in the common pool at the end of a round, the more additional
tokens get added back to recharge and refill the pool. Similarly, the fewer tokens left in
the common pool at the end of a round, the fewer additional tokens get added back to
recharge and refill the pool. This is similar to earning interest or a reward based on the
amount of tokens in the common pool. There is an opportunity to keep the common pool
large which would allow more rounds of play to increase your private fund.
However, if the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low - drops below
a certain threshold - there will be negative consequences for all group members. This is
similar to a requirement to maintain a minimum account balance in the common pool.
If the common pool drops below the threshold, for the rest of the game there will be no
recharge - the pool will not be refilled after each round - and, in addition, each group
member will lose 1/3 of the tokens on hand in their private fund. The game changing
threshold amount is not revealed to the group members, until after the number of tokens
in the common pool is less than the threshold.
At the beginning of each round, the policy maker will secretly make an official guess
for the location of the threshold. This will be done on the computer, entering the number
of tokens in the common pool believed to be the threshold where the negative conse-
quences will go into effect. For example, if the policy maker enters “999” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 999 tokens, recharge will
stop and everyone will lose 1/3 of their tokens. If the policy maker enters “3” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 3 tokens, recharge will stop
and everyone will lose 1/3 of their tokens. Of course, the policy maker may not choose a
threshold higher than the number of tokens currently in the pool.
This guess will be announced to the rest of the group.
After seeing the policy maker’s guess of the threshold, when you are one of the 4 with-
drawing players, you may guess for yourself, if you wish, where you think the threshold
might be, and then individually decide how many tokens you would like to withdraw
from the common pool to add to your private fund, knowing that the other players are
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doing the same. You will be shown the current number of tokens in the common pool
and the maximum number of tokens which you can remove. You are allowed to take out
from 0 up to 25 tokens each round. You will enter the desired number in the box on the
computer screen and then click the “OK” button.
The other members of your group will also be making their own independent with-
drawal decisions. The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed
in your private fund and are not available to other members, and likewise, the tokens
withdrawn by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private
funds and are not available to you.
After all members have taken their desired tokens from the common pool, as long as
the common pool remains above the actual threshold, the pool will get recharged. The
policy maker will then see the current number of tokens in the pool after withdrawal
and recharge. They will then have the option to enforce their guess and punish the other
group members for getting too close to where they believe the threshold is located, for
taking out too many tokens. If they decide to punish, in exchange for 100 personal tokens
paid back to the common pool, 50 tokens are removed from the private funds of the 4
withdrawing players. These tokens disappear.
At the conclusion of the round, after all 4 players have chosen their amount of with-
drawal and policy maker has made entered their punishment decision, a screen will dis-
play the total number of tokens currently in the common pool and the number of tokens
collected into your private fund.
After all 4 players have chosen their amount of withdrawal and the policy maker has
made enforcement decision, a screen will display the total number of token in the com-
mon pool and the number of tokens in your private fund. If the policy maker should
choose to punish the other group members you will be notified.
A new round will start with the jobs rotated, and a different player in the role of policy
maker, making an announced guess of the threshold. Then the 4 withdrawing members
will make their independent decisions for withdrawal from the common pool, from 0 to
25 tokens. This is followed by the policy maker making their enforcement decision. As
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before, the size of the pool and the total number of tokens in your private fund will be
displayed. Play will continue until the common pool level is “broke” - so small that all
withdrawing members cannot withdraw their maximum allotment.
You will be notified if the policy maker chose to punish. You will also be notified when
the number of tokens in the pool has reached the true threshold, the number of tokens is
too low and negative consequences have taken place.
All decisions will be kept anonymous. The number of tokens in your private fund at
the end of the experiment will determine your earnings. Each token in your private fund
will be converted to 2.5 cents.
Bankruptcy: If you should have negative tokens at any point, you can invest your $5
show-up payment into the game to cover your loss.
Remember:
• 1 token = $0.025
• You will receive a show-up payment of $5
• You withdraw 0 to 25 tokens each period from the common pool that is available to
all players
• Each round a rotating policy maker makes an announced guess of the value of the
threshold
• The policy maker can enforce the guess of the threshold:
• Paying 100 tokens to the common pool 1111
• Taking away 50 tokens from all other players
• When the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low, below the thresh-
old:
• Recharge to the pool STOPS for the rest of the game
• All group members lose 13 of their tokens 111111111
• The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it
is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties
that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
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The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed in your private
fund and are no longer available to other members, and likewise, the tokens withdrawn
by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private funds and are
no longer available to you.
